73% of banks surveyed lack a clear view of suppliers’ quantum-security plans
Only 8% said they had started carrying out their roadmap. The ECB plans a separate readiness survey.
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Nearly three in four respondents to a new survey of banks in the European Union and European Economic Area said they had little or no insight into how their suppliers plan to replace cryptography vulnerable to future quantum computers. The European Banking Authority put the figure at 73% in its November 19 risk report: those respondents knew nothing about the plans or had only informal indications, without documented roadmaps.[1]
The gap matters because a bank can pick a date to upgrade, but it may still need a software vendor to ship a compatible product. A bank could be ready to switch protections on its side and still have to test whether the service it pays for can make the same change. Think of a bank updating the software behind sign-ins: a new cryptographic standard alone does not tell it whether the existing tools will work together.
The EBA received responses from 85 banks in August and September. That is the size of the overall survey, not a confirmed denominator for every question. The results reflect what participating banks reported, not an audit of their systems or an estimate for every bank in Europe.[2]
A target date is not an upgrade
The EBA found that 66% were targeting completion for critical or high-risk uses by 2030. That is an intended milestone for some uses, not a deadline imposed by this survey or evidence that the work is on track.[1]
On a separate roadmap question, only 8% reported an operational plan. Another 9% reported an approved plan, and 33% had a draft.[2]
“Operational” has a specific meaning in the questionnaire: an approved plan in execution, with responsibilities and progress tracking. It does not mean a bank has finished replacing vulnerable cryptography. Nor does the survey tell us whether the same respondents that chose 2030 are the ones already carrying out a plan.[2]
Why suppliers matter
The most selected hurdle was the cost and complexity of upgrading older systems, reported by 61%. Knowing what a supplier intends to do is one step. Knowing which versions are supported and whether systems work together after an update is a different one.[1]
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology’s migration work treats finding vulnerable cryptography and testing interoperability as separate tasks.[4]
Post-quantum cryptography means changing the mathematical protections used by ordinary computers; customers do not need quantum hardware. The planning problem is how to replace some of the protections used to establish trusted connections and verify digital signatures without interrupting the services they support.[4][5]
What the ECB plans to check
In its separate 2027–29 supervisory priorities, ECB Banking Supervision lists a planned survey to evaluate banks’ readiness for the transition. That follow-up is not a completed inspection or a new migration deadline. It gives supervisors a way to ask how banks are translating plans into work.[3]
The separate UK practices address how to upgrade without interrupting services. The global securities watchdog IOSCO has warned about a different problem: misleading quantum claims. Europe’s new survey gives readers another way to judge progress. Instead of asking only which year a bank has circled, look for evidence that its suppliers have documented their plans and that the upgrade is actually underway.