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NEC and IBM Japan combine quantum keys with post-quantum cryptography

The companies tested two ways of establishing encryption secrets together, without changing existing applications.

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Two secret inputs, from QKD and ML-KEM-768, feed HKDF-SHA256 to derive a traffic-protection secret. A separate lane shows ML-DSA-44 certificate signatures authenticating the peers.
Conceptual view of NEC and IBM Japan’s test: QKD and post-quantum secret material are combined to protect traffic. Certificate signatures separately authenticate the communicating peers. Original QubitWire diagram, not a network topology or product interface.QubitWire

NEC and IBM Japan have tested a way to add quantum-distributed keys to post-quantum protection for network connections without rewriting existing applications. Announced on November 17, the July–September demonstration connected NEC equipment to a custom version of IBM Quantum Safe Proxy, an intermediary handling secure connections.[1]

The system combined two ingredients: secret material delivered by NEC’s quantum key distribution equipment and a shared secret established by post-quantum software. It used the combination to derive the secret protecting network traffic. Digital certificates still checked who was communicating.[1]

That distinction matters. Establishing a shared secret and checking identity are different jobs. The software used ML-KEM, a NIST-standardized way to establish a secret over a public channel, and ML-DSA digital signatures for authentication. Both are designed to resist attacks by future quantum computers; neither requires a quantum computer to run.[2][3]

The companies demonstrated that their equipment and software could work together. They did not test quantum keys as a replacement for certificate authentication or as an independent backup channel. Financial-sector applications are a proposed next step, not an announced banking deployment.[1]

For prospective users, the useful result is compatibility with existing applications. The next questions are practical: how the combined system performs, what it costs to operate and how it handles failures.

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Evidence & context

3 linked sources

Company-reported interoperability test; standards provide technical context.

How to read the evidence and dates

An announcement records what an organization stated. An experiment reports an observation. A simulation or resource estimate depends on its assumptions. QubitWire’s analysis connects these sources; the labels are not quality scores.

Published is the article’s first QubitWire publication. Updated marks a substantive content change. Sources checked records a review of the underlying evidence. An older paper can support a new explanation, and another press release about the same work is not independent replication.

Sources

  1. NEC and IBM Japan hybrid communications demonstration

    November 17 announcement of July–September 2026 validation.

  2. NIST FIPS 203: ML-KEM

    Key-establishment standard; context, not validation of NEC’s system.

  3. NIST FIPS 204: ML-DSA

    Digital-signature standard; context, not validation of NEC’s system.

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